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1. Introduction 
 Excuses are commonplace. Making and accepting excuses is part of 
our practice of holding each other morally responsible. But excuses are also 
curious. They have normative force. Whether someone has an excuse for 
something they have done matters for how we should respond to their 
action. An excuse can make it appropriate to forgo blame, to revise 
judgments of blameworthiness, to feel compassion and pity instead of 
anger and resentment.  
 The considerations we appeal to when making excuses are a motley 
bunch: tiredness, stress, a looming work deadline, a wailing infant, poverty, 
duress, ignorance. What unifies these various considerations as a class? In 
virtue of what can they all excuse? And what does their normative force 
consist in? 
 While particular excuses – chiefly, moral ignorance and duress – have 
attracted significant discussion in the literature, these more general 
questions have received less attention.  Indeed, some suggest that 1
investigating particular excuses is all we can do; a unified account is not to 
be had. For example, Victor Tadros claims:  
I do not think that it is particularly helpful to search for a general 
theory of excuses. Rather, we are best theoretically to investigate 
particular kinds of excuse claims. The upshot of such an 
investigation may be a general theory of excuses. However, I think 
that unlikely. I argue that there is probably no general theory of 
 For discussions of moral ignorance, see Calhoun [1989], Moody-Adams [1994], Rosen 1
[2004] and [2008], Harman [2015], [2011], Zimmerman [1988] and [1997], Arpaly & 
Schroeder [2014]. For discussions of duress, see Rosen [2014] and Baron [2014]. 




 I disagree. This paper aims to develop a unified account of excuses: 
what they are and what they do. In a nutshell, I argue that excuses are 
considerations that show that an agent’s wrongdoing does not manifest a 
specific motivational failing: namely, the lack of a morally adequate 
present-directed intention. What do excuses do? I suggest that they 
function as responsibility-modifiers. They alter how the wrongdoer, the 
wronged party, bystanders may morally respond to a wrong, without 
negating that it remains appropriate to respond in some way. 
     Here is how the paper will proceed. I start by examining two 
influential accounts of excuses – one recently defended by Jay Wallace, the 
other tracing back to David Hume. I argue that, while initially promising, 
both accounts face significant problems. I then develop an alternative, the 
Good Intention Account, and showcase its advantages. A chief one, I 
argue, is that it captures the various considerations we appeal to when we 
make excuses into a unified account. Finally, I take up the relationship 
between excuses and moral responsibility. Contrary to received wisdom, I 
argue that excuses do not negate moral responsibility but modify the way 
in which an agent is morally responsible for her wrong. 
 A few clarifications before we start. To excuse can refer to an action: 
we excuse and ask to be excused. But we also say that someone has an 
excuse, that they are looking for an excuse, that something is (or isn’t) an 
excuse. Used in this way, excuses refer to facts or considerations with 
particular normative significance. My focus here will be on this latter sense 
because I take it to be more basic. We ask to be excused by oﬀering a 
consideration we take to constitute an excuse. We excuse someone when 
we think the consideration they put forward is an excuse. 
 The second clarification is this. We often talk dismissively about 
people “making excuses” when we want to say that they are oﬀering “bad” 
excuses –  spurious, unconvincing ones. Here, I will assume that a 
consideration is an excuse only if it in fact excuses. To make a “bad excuse” 
is to put forward a consideration that is not a genuine excuse.    3
 Third, a caveat. We make excuses for a broken promise but also for 
breaches of etiquette, for criminal oﬀenses, for violations of professional 
norms, and even false beliefs. In this paper, I focus solely on excuses in our 
moral practice – whether we can extend the account to other domains will 
be left to future work. 
 Tadros [2005], p. 295. Similarly, Baron frames excuses as having a disjunctive structure: 2
they are either considerations that tell us something about the agent or about her 
situation. See Baron, 2007, p. 22-23.
 Relatedly, this paper is about the normative phenomenon of excuses, not our linguistic 3
practice. Our everyday usage of the word “excuse” does not always line up with the 
normative phenomenon of excuses. To say “excuse me” can sometimes be a way of making 
a (passive-aggressive) accusation, rather than an excuse.
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2. The Obligation Account 
 I will begin with an influential account of what excuses are and how 
they work. In general, we are to blame when our actions have violated a 
moral norm or obligation. According to a popular line of thought, excuses 
can render blame inappropriate in virtue of showing that although it may 
look like we have violated a particular moral norm, we haven’t in fact done 
so. I will call this account the Obligation Account.  
 The Obligation Account has been most fully articulated and 
defended by Wallace.  Wallace argues: 4
...excuses function by showing that the agent did not really violate 
the moral obligations we accept after all. [...] To hold s morally 
responsible for x, when an excusing condition obtains, would 
involve the false belief that s's x-ing violated a moral obligation we 
accept; this gives us a reason for not holding people to blame when 
the excusing conditions are present.    5
 Why do excuses show that the moral obligation in question was not 
violated? Wallace accepts an account of moral obligation on which our 
obligations govern first and foremost our choices. Moral norms do not tell 
us what to do but rather what to choose. As Wallace argues:  
...it is only through the mediation of our choices that the reasons 
expressed in moral principle may influence either our emotions or 
feelings, or the bodily movements we make. […] one cannot be 
said to have violated a moral obligation in the absence of a relevant 
choice.  6
Insofar as our moral obligations concern actions, they concern intentional 
actions: actions that were done as a result of a choice. Again, Wallace says: 
More formally, one may say that moral obligations generally rule 
out doing actions of kind x, as a result of the choice to do 
something of kind x.   7
 The view that obligations govern our choices is not unique to 
Wallace. Thus, Barbara Herman argues that we should not conceive of 
moral obligations “as obligations to do certain actions (or kinds of 
actions)”. Rather, she suggests:  
The necessity that comes with an obligatory end constrains not 
 Wallace [1994]. Hieronymi suggests a similar picture of excuses. Hieronymi argues that 4
blame involves three judgments: (1) that the action is wrong, (2) that the wrongdoer is a 
member of the moral community, and (3) that you, the one who has been wronged, ought 
not to be wronged. Like Wallace, Hieronymi, too, regards a denial of (1) as an excuse. 
Unlike Wallace, she also classes the denials of (2) and (3) as excuses. See her [2001], p. 
530.
 Wallace [1994], p. 133-34.5
 ibid, p. 132, highlight in original.6
 ibid, p. 144.7
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action but the will.   8
 The Obligation Account is simple and elegant. One of its virtues is a 
compelling explanation for why excuses shield an agent from blame. If 
blame responds to violations of moral norms and an excuse shows that the 
norm wasn’t violated, then blame is undeserved. To continue to blame 
someone, while accepting their excuse, would be irrational.   
 Furthermore, it can seemingly accommodate the wide range of 
considerations to which we appeal when we make excuses. In particular, we 
can distinguish two types of excuses: first, considerations that show that 
the agent has simply not made any choice at all and thus cannot have 
violated a moral obligation. As Wallace argues:  
...if one does x as the result of being pushed, or because of a 
muscular twitch or spasm, then one hasn’t really acted at all.  9
 Second, there are considerations that concede that the agent made a 
choice but show that it was compatible with her moral obligations. 
Wallace continues:  
...if one does x inadvertently, or by accident, then – though one 
may have acted – one didn’t do x intentionally; and if one does x as 
a result of coercion or duress, then – though one may have done x 
intentionally – one hasn’t merely done x intentionally, one has done 
x-rather-than-y.   10
 The Obligation Account accommodates why so many of our excuses 
appeal to an action’s being unintentional: “I didn’t mean to...”, “I didn’t 
realize...”, “It wasn’t my intention...” It says that there is a close connection 
between what we do intentionally and the choices our actions express. To 
dispute that an act was intentional is to dispute that the morally 
illegitimate choice was made and hence that a moral obligation was 
violated:   
...the importance of intention lies in determining whether agent s 
has really done x, a morally impermissible act, in the first place. If 
the moral expectations we place on other people are primarily 
expectations concerning their attitudes toward us and others, as 
manifested in action, then what will be prohibited and required of 
people will not be types of bodily movement per se, but rather the 
attitudes expressed in bodily movements.    11
 The Obligation Account looks appealing. Its central thought is that 
excuses negate wrongdoing: their function is to show that an agent has not 
violated her moral obligations. This captures that many diﬀerent 
considerations can comprise excuses, while identifying an underlying unity. 
 The Obligation Account faces two serious challenges. The first is to 
 Herman [1993], p. 169.8
 Wallace [1994], p. 121.9
 ibid, p. 121.10
 ibid, p. 126.11
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distinguish excuses from considerations that forestall the need for excuses. 
Wallace classifies considerations that show that an agent did not act, and 
hence did not violate her obligations, as a type of excuse.   
 But such considerations do not constitute excuses. Suppose that, 
trying to commit the perfect crime, you drug me unconscious, wrap my 
fingers around a gun, and pull the trigger, killing the victim. Since I was 
unconscious, I did not exercise my capacity for choice. I didn’t act in any 
way. But it is odd to say that this gives me an excuse for the killing. Since I 
didn’t act, I didn’t kill. And so, I don’t need an excuse. It’s you, the 
murderer, who needs one.    
 The second challenge is to give a principled distinction between 
excuses and justifications. According to Wallace, considerations that show 
that the agent did act but her underlying choice was permissible and did 
not violate any moral obligations constitute a second type of excuses. 
Wallace suggests that this is how appeals to duress work:  
[excuses appealing to duress work by] showing that agent’s doing x 
actually expressed a diﬀerent kind of motive: not merely a choice to 
do x, but a choice to do x-rather-than-y, or x-in-order-to-avoid-y. 
[...] Whether an explanation of this form will serve as an excuse 
will then depend on the content of our moral obligations-in 
particular, whether they prohibit intentionally doing x-rather-than- 
y.  12
When your choosing to do x-rather-than-y (or x-in-order-to-avoid-y) is 
permissible, you have an excuse.  
 This is not right. If, given your circumstances, it was genuinely 
permissible to make the choice you did, we do not invoke an excuse. 
Rather, we say that your action was justified. Suppose a villain puts a gun to 
my head, threatening to kill my child unless I compliment his sweater. The 
sweater is hideous, yet I oblige: I tell a lie. Given the circumstances, the lie 
is not just excused, it is justified. But if an action is justified, it needs no 
excuse. 
 Because the Obligation Account collapses the distinction between 
excuses and justifications it has trouble allowing that agents can have an 
excuse even when they act impermissibly. Consider someone who, subject 
to police intimidation, gives false testimony in court, which leads to the 
conviction of an innocent person. We can fill in the details to make it 
plausible that the action was impermissible: the interrogation is distressing 
but not physically violent, the threats made by the police are serious but 
not as serious as spending years behind bars. The agent ought not give in 
to the police intimidation; in doing so, she acts wrongly. Nevertheless, the 
coercive nature of the interrogation may constitute an excuse.   13
 More generally, tiredness, stress, and other emotional upset 
 Wallace [1994], p. 144.12
 See Rosen [2014] for another example of excused wrongdoing under duress.13
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plausibly do not bear on what moral obligations we have, nor do they 
prevent us from acting intentionally. Yet they can excuse. The Obligation 
Account cannot allow for that. 
 Views on which moral obligations concern choices, not actions, 
generally struggle to find conceptual room for a notion of excuse distinct 
from justification. A key motivation for such views is that it may not 
always be reasonable to expect us to perform some action but it is always 
reasonable to expect us to make the relevant choice. Thus, we can always be 
expected to abide by our obligations. This leaves no room for excuses, since 
those require the possibility of moral failure that does not reflect badly on 
us qua moral agents. 
 In what follows, I will assume that our moral obligations govern 
first and foremost actions, not choices. This is independently well-
motivated. We can create new moral obligations by promising and waive 
existing ones by giving consent. An account of moral obligations needs to 
mesh with those moral practices.  
 Plausibly, the content of our moral obligations will mirror the 
content of what we promise and consent to. We consent to being operated 
on or hugged. We promise to pick up the child from nursery, to visit soon. 
We would be rightly suspicious if our partner phrased their promise in 
terms of choice rather than action: “Fair enough, you promise to choose to 
pick up the child. But do you also promise to pick up the child?” We 
promise and consent to actions, not choices. 
3. The Character Account  
 Excuses come into play when agents act wrongly: when they violate 
some moral norm or obligation. If excuses do not negate the charge of 
wrongdoing, they must negate some other moral criticism that can be 
inherent in blame. An influential alternative to the Obligation Account 
connects excuses to the wrongdoer’s character. It says that “an objectively 
wrong action (or an action in some way out of order) is excused if it does 
not manifest some defect of character.”  Call this the Character Account. 14
 The Character Account improves on the Obligations Account in a 
few ways. It respects the distinction between excuses and justifications. 
Many considerations we oﬀer as excuses – tiredness, severe stress – can be 
understood as circumstances in which the agent is “not properly herself ”. 
But the Character Account faces trouble once we try to nail down its 
details.  
 A wrong action’s “not manifesting some defect of character” is not 
suﬃcient for its being excused. Character traits are dispositions that are 
made up of patterns of motivations across diﬀerent times and 
circumstances. But when we ask whether an agent has an excuse for some 
wrong, we are not interested in how she usually acts. We are interested in 
 Brandt [1969], p. 354. The inspiration for those accounts is Hume [1960], book II, part 14
III, sec. II; and [1955], sec. VIII, part II.
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her state of mind at the moment of action – how it was motivated. If you 
have betrayed my secret, it won’t do to just point out that you are generally 
discreet.  15
 We can tweak the Character Account to escape the worry. Holly 
Smith suggests we understand it as follows: “An excuse functions, we 
might say, to block the natural inference from a wrongful act to the agent’s 
having a reprehensible motive for performing that act.”  Motive here 16
refers to whichever psychological state motivates the action: a desire, 
intention, value, or aﬀective state.  The focus on the motivations that leads 17
to the wrongful action is an improvement. Still, the revised view faces 
diﬃculties.  
 Understood in this way, the lack of a reprehensible motive is not 
necessary for an excuse. Provocation can be an excuse. But when, incensed 
by my co-worker’s obnoxious remarks, I lose my temper and pour my cup 
of coﬀee into his lap, I am – at that moment – acting from a reprehensible 
motive. I desire to ruin his trousers and to scald his thighs. Losing my 
temper is a matter of this reprehensible desire “getting the better of me”. 
Still, the fact that I was provoked may constitute an excuse. 
 A lack of reprehensible motive is also not suﬃcient. Desires to kill, 
maim, harm, insult are clearly reprehensible motives. But much 
wrongdoing is caused by more mundane motivations: a student may cheat 
on her test to not disappoint her parents, a friend may supply a false alibi 
out of loyalty. Such motives may be morally criticizable but they are hardly 
morally reprehensible. Yet they do not constitute excuses. 
 The rest of this paper develops an alternative account of excuses: the 
Good Intention Account. I suggest that excuses point to the presence of a 
morally adequate motive, rather than the absence of a reprehensible one. 
Second, I suggest that it's a particular type of motive that matters for 
excuses: a morally adequate present-directed intention. The shift to present-
directed intentions is crucial because present-directed intentions have a 
distinctive motivational profile that allows for a unified theory of excuses.  
 The next section sets out the Good Intention Account and its central 
ingredients. 
4. The Good Intention Account 
 Here is the account, in a nutshell. When someone commits a wrong, 
we may generally infer that they lacked a morally adequate present-
directed intention. Excuses block that inference. Excuses are 
 See Gardner [2007], pp. 122-124 for further criticism.15
 In Becker & Becker [2011], p. 507.16
 ibid. See also Brandt [1969], p. 356 for this broad reading. Taking “motive” to include 17
desires is established philosophical usage, see, for example, Arpaly [2003], Arpaly & 
Schroeder [2014], Markovits [2010]. Humeans, in particular, typically understand 
“motive” to denote all conative states partly because they take all conative states to be 
reducible to desires. See Smith [1994], pp. 92-125 for an articulation of this view. 
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considerations that show that the agent’s wrongdoing does not reflect her 
lack of a morally adequate present-directed intention. 
 Let me start by unpacking the central ingredients. Following 
Bratman, Harman, Holton and others, I take intentions to be mental states 
characterized by their distinct functional role in action and planning.  18
One of their marks is their stability: once formed, they tend to persist, 
unless they are reconsidered and revised. A second mark is their close 
connection to action. They are controlling: unless revised, an intention will 
lead the agent to act. 
 Intentions can be future- or present-directed. Future-directed 
intentions commit us to plans of action in the future. A special class of 
such intentions are resolutions –  these are standing commitments to 
courses of action. I may have a policy of only wearing black or not 
repeating gossip. Both future-directed intentions and resolutions facilitate 
inter- and intra-personal planning by curtailing deliberation. For example, 
if I have a policy of only wearing black, I do not need to expend cognitive 
resources on how to dress. I just reach for the black shirt.   
 Present-directed intentions concern what to do right now; they 
guide action in the moment.  The fact that present-directed intentions are 19
controlling make them importantly diﬀerent from desires. 
 I can have two simultaneous conflicting desires – to keep working 
on my paper and to go for a run – and act on one of them without revising 
or giving up the other. But I cannot have two simultaneous conflicting 
present-directed intentions and act on one of them without giving up or 
revising the other. Both are controlling and they both make inconsistent 
demands on my immediate actions. Unless I revise or give up one of them, 
I will experience practical paralysis: I cannot leave the house and remain 
seated at the desk at the same time.   20
 This has important consequences for which inferences we can draw 
about an agent’s motivation, given her actions. Suppose you see me on a 
run outside. You are entitled to infer that I do not have a present-directed 
intention to keep working on my paper. For if I had that intention, I would 
 See Bratman [1987], Holton [2009], Harman [1986] for arguments why intentions 18
cannot be reduced to combinations of belief and desires.
 See Bratman [1987], Holton [2009], pp. 12-14 for discussion of present-directed 19
intentions.
 Desires come in diﬀerent strengths but intentions are widely seen as binary, so for two 20
conflicting present-directed intentions there is nothing that could break the tie. The sole 
exception is Holton [2009], chapter 2 who argues for a notion of partial intentions. But 
Holton’s sense of intentions being partial is very diﬀerent from that of desires being 
strong or weak. Crucially, an agent with partial intentions has “two or more competing 
plans” for the same end (p. 36). Partial intentions make up a coherent plan with provisions 
for diﬀerent ways the world might be. An agent forms partial, as opposed to all-out 
intentions in order to deal with epistemic uncertainty about which way of realizing the 
end will be eﬀective.
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be sitting at my desk. But you cannot infer that I have no desire to work 
on my paper. I may strongly desire to keep working but decided to take 
advantage of the brief sunny spell. 
 How do we acquire present-directed intentions? Future-directed 
intentions and resolutions will often automatically give rise to present-
directed intentions. As Holton notes:   
...if intentions are thought of as enduring states, then, for almost all 
intentions, there will come a point at which they are to be 
implemented. In that sense, then, they will be intentions to 
perform an action now. A future-directed intention will simply 
turn into a present-directed intention with the passage of time.  21
Similarly, resolutions will turn into present-directed intentions when the 
relevant conditions obtain. A resolution to wear only black will turn into a 
present-directed intention to reach for the black shirt when I need to get 
dressed.  
 But we can also acquire present-directed intentions consciously by 
deliberating about what to do. When I think about whether to go to the 
Champion of the Thames or The Mill for an after-work pint and choose 
the latter, I thereby form the requisite present-directed intention to walk 
to The Mill. The ability to form present-directed intentions comes 
particularly handy in situations of incommensurability or indiﬀerence, 
where our desires are not enough to move us to act one way or the other.   22
 When it comes to excuses, it is present-directed intentions that 
matter. When confronted with wrongdoing, we care about the wrongdoer’s 
motivation at the moment of action –  not her general resolutions and 
plans. For this reason, and because the term "present-directed intention” is 
a bit of a mouthful, I will occasionally use the term “intention” and 
“present-directed intention” interchangeably. If at any point I mean to refer 
to future-directed intentions, I will flag this explicitly.  
 Suppose we witness a student cheating on her final exam to avoid 
disappointing her parents, thereby violating a moral obligation or norm. 
What are we entitled to infer about her motivation? We cannot infer that 
she was guided by a conative attitude with morally reprehensible content; 
it is not morally reprehensible to want to spare one’s parents 
disappointment. Nor can we infer that she did not desire to be honest, for 
we often act in conflict with some of our desires. We can, however, infer 
that she is not guided by a morally adequate present-directed intention: 
she lacked the intention to be truthful. For if she had that intention, she 
would not have cheated. 
 In general, when we witness wrongdoing, we are entitled to infer the 
lack of a morally adequate present-directed intention. I say “in general” 
because this inference is defeasible. This is where excuses come in. Excuses 
are considerations that block this inference. An excuse shows that the 
 Holton [2009], p. 13.21
 ibid, p. 13. 22
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agent’s wrongdoing does not reflect the lack of a morally adequate 
intention. We have arrived at the Good Intention Account. 
 How do excuses block the inference from wrongdoing to the lack of 
a morally adequate present-directed intention? For limited agents like us, 
having a morally adequate present-directed intention is no guarantee that 
we will abide by our moral requirements. Several pitfalls remain. Our 
epistemic limitations may lead us astray; we have limited attention spans 
and time, incomplete (sometimes misleading) evidence, limited reasoning 
skills. We may prescribe a medical treatment to which the patient has an 
unforeseen adverse reaction or take a wrong turn on the way to the airport, 
causing our friend to miss her flight. Or we might stumble and lose our 
balance while helping our friend carry a valuable (and fragile) possession. 
Or a morally adequate intention can fail to get traction on our action 
because of limitations of our will: we have limited self-control, patience, 
tempers. In the face of terror, exhaustion, or provocation we may lose the 
ability to act on our intentions altogether.  
 Excuses thus work by oﬀering an alternative diagnosis of our 
wrongdoing: rather than tracing it to a lack of morally adequate intention, 
they trace it to these other sources of error. This means that the Good 
Intention Account traces the structure of excuses to the structure of our 
agency and its limitations. 
 With the outline of the Good Intention Account on the table, the 
next step is to put it to work. 
5. Unifying Excuses 
 This section considers the various considerations we put forward as 
excuses and argues that the Good Intention Account has a principled way 
of capturing them. At the same time, we will be filling in more detail. 
“I didn’t do it on purpose!”   
 Consider a common way of making an excuse: “I’m so sorry, I didn’t 
mean to oﬀend,” or “I didn’t intend to give away a secret – I thought this 
was common knowledge,” or “I was just trying to...”. They take the form of 
an appeal: yes, I did act wrongly –  I broke the promise, gave away the 
secret, caused the oﬀense – but unintentionally so. 
 The Good Intention Account explains why one’s wrongdoing being 
unintentional can constitute an excuse. To say that it was unintentional is 
just to say that it did not reflect the lack of a morally adequate intention. 
Rather, something went wrong in putting my morally adequate intention 
into action: I slipped, tripped, lost my balance, or I was ignorant about 
some crucial feature of the situation.  
 Consider Jones who stirs a heaping spoonful of poison into Smith’s 
tea. Since he has every reason to believe that the white powder is sugar, the 
poisoning is unintentional. In light of this, the wrongful deed does not 
reflect a lack of morally adequate present-directed intention. Jones is 
guided by the present-directed intention to sweeten Smith’s tea; there is 
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nothing untoward about that. The poisoning reflects Jones’ ignorance about 
the content of the sugar bowl.  
 “But wait,” you might object, “surely, having done something 
unintentionally isn’t always an excuse!” Indeed. The Good Intention 
Account does not say that whenever one’s wrongdoing is unintentional, 
one is thereby excused. The considerations we appeal to in order to show 
that the wrongdoing was unintentional can sometimes themselves reflect a 
lack of morally adequate present-directed intention. Above, I stipulated 
that Jones’ false belief about the white powder is justified. But suppose that 
it is the result of negligence – Jones pulled the package from the bathroom 
closet, not the kitchen, and didn’t check the label, blithely assuming it to 
be sugar. In that case, Jones’ false belief itself reflects a lack of morally 
adequate present-directed intention – namely, the intention to check the 
label carefully, so as to not put someone in harm’s way. The Good Intention 
Account says, correctly, that it does not constitute an excuse. The same is 
true if Jones’ false belief manifests recklessness. Thus, suppose Jones thinks 
there is some chance that the white powder is poison but refrains from 
investigating further. In this case, Jones deliberately took a gamble on 
Smith’s life; that certainly reflects a lack of morally adequate intention. He 
has no excuse.  
 The Good Intention Account accommodates a common way of 
blocking the excuse that the wrongdoer was ignorant or misled about some 
morally significant feature of her action. We can block this excuse by 
pointing out that she should have known. This riposte does not deny that 
the wrongdoer was ignorant about the claim in question. But it maintains 
that the ignorance itself manifests a lack of morally adequate intentions.   
Moral Ignorance 
 Jones’ wrongdoing resulted from him mistaking poison for sugar. But 
what if we are dealing with someone whose ignorance concerns a moral 
truth? What about a fervent Nazi who reports a Jewish family to the 
Gestapo, taking herself to “do her moral duty”?  
 Moral ignorance can be (and often is) the upshot of recklessness or 
negligence in one’s moral inquiry; as such, it fails to excuse. Still, there are 
environments in which certain kinds of wrongdoing are so normalized that 
it is plausible an agent may have acquired a mistaken moral belief non-
culpably.  The question for the Good Intention Account is whether 23
someone can both act on a false moral belief and yet have a morally 
adequate intention. 
 It may be tempting to think that false moral beliefs about a situation 
will always prevent an agent from forming a morally adequate intention in 
that situation. The fervent Nazi’s misguided beliefs in Nazi ideology 
prevents her from forming the intention to respect all persons’ humanity. 
Her wrongdoing reflects this lack. This suggests that wrongdoing done 
 See Calhoun [1989].23
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from moral ignorance cannot be excused. 
 But this is too quick. Sometimes agents act on false moral beliefs 
and we do regard their wrongdoing as excused. Consider an overworked 
emergency doctor who genuinely cares about her patients. She is 
confronted with a stroke patient and has to decide between two treatment 
options, trading oﬀ risk of death against expected quality of life in a snap 
decision. She decides to pursue the more invasive treatment because she 
gives slightly greater weight to minimizing risk of death. Suppose that’s a 
mistake. She ought to have given greater weight to quality of life and 
pursued the less invasive treatment – her moral deliberation was flawed.  
 The doctor’s wrong action is based on a mistaken moral belief. Still, 
the fact that she tried to do what’s best for the patient counts in favor of 
cutting her some slack. We see her wrong action in a diﬀerent moral light 
than that of the fanatical Nazi or that of a cynical doctor who pursues the 
more invasive treatment because it allows her to charge the patient more. 
 The challenge is to reconcile these seemingly conflicting intuitive 
verdicts: the Nazi’s belief that she’s “doing her moral duty” does not move 
us. Yet the fact that the doctor is trying to do what’s best for the patient 
does.  
 I think reconciliation is possible. To see how, we need to say more 
about moral adequacy and the structure of present-directed intentions.  
 First, intentions. Present-directed intentions are plans that guide 
actions. This means that their content cannot be exhausted by an abstract 
goal. I cannot act on a present-directed intention whose sole content is “to 
go to Japan” because this is not specific enough to determine a course of 
action. My intention needs to include a conception of how to realize that 
goal. For example, I intend to go to Japan by taking a flight out of 
Heathrow by boarding the 16:30 British Airways flight to Tokyo. The 
content of intentions has hierarchical structure: there’s an overarching goal 
and a conception of the steps necessary to realize it.   24
 This suggests a natural way of how to evaluate intentions for 
adequacy. To assess an intention for adequacy is to assess it as a plan with 
respect to a given goal. How adequate a plan is with respect to that goal 
depends on how conducive it is to realizing it –  for example, how 
conducive my intention to go to Japan is to getting me there.  
 The aim with respect to which we evaluate an intention or plan will 
often be internal to it. But we can also evaluate an intention with respect 
to an external goal. We might evaluate my intention to go to Japan with 
respect to how conducive it will be to my health or to minimizing my 
carbon footprint, even if those goals does not figure in my intention at all. 
 Adequacy is not a binary notion: given some particular aim, plans 
can be more or less adequate. A plan can be, on the whole, adequate even 
when it is ultimately unsuccessful. My plan to go to Japan by taking the 
 This is congruent with work on action-guidance by neuroscientists. See, e.g.  Duncan et. 24
al. [1996].
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train to Heathrow may be adequate even when it fails – there’s an accident 
on the line and train service to London Heathrow is suspended. Contrast 
this with the plan to go to Japan by taking the Eurostar (based on a poor 
grasp of geography) –  that plan is clearly inadequate; it is doomed from 
the outset. 
 Now for moral adequacy. We can evaluate intentions for moral 
adequacy by assessing them relative to a relevant moral goal – for example, 
the goal of doing the right thing, or treating all persons with humanity. 
With this in mind, let us revisit our cases above. Even if the Nazi’s 
overarching aim was to  “do the right thing”, this could not have been the 
sole content of the intention guiding her. “Doing the right thing” is too 
abstract to issue in action in any given situation. The full content of the 
intention guiding the Nazi is plausibly something like “to do the right 
thing by ensuring the racial purity of her community by weeding out all 
Jews.” And even if the Nazi’s own overarching goal of “doing the right 
thing” is morally fine, the full intention is morally objectionable.  Keeping 25
one’s community “racially pure” is incompatible with doing the right thing, 
not just in this particular situation but in all conceivable circumstances –
  the Nazi is spectacularly mistaken about the nature of doing the right 
thing. And, of course, the Nazi’s present-directed intention also fails to be 
morally adequate when evaluated with respect to other moral goals: 
treating all persons with humanity, for example.   26
 Contrast this with the doctor. She acted on the present-directed 
intention to do what is best for the patient by pursuing the treatment 
option that fares best on a careful analysis of risks and benefits by pursing 
the one that fares better on survival rates. Doing what’s best for the patient 
is a morally sound aim and carefully trading oﬀ risks and benefits of the 
treatment options is a good way to realize that aim. The doctor is correct 
about which facts about the treatments are morally relevant and their 
moral valence. Where she goes wrong is in the very final step: in exactly 
how to weigh them.  
 In light of this, we may well judge the doctor’s present-directed 
 Those moved by “moral fetishism” worries will think that there is something morally 25
objectionable about such an overarching goal or any intention with “de dicto” content. See 
Smith [1994], p.98, Arpaly [2003], pp. 71-73, Markovits [2010], p. 203. They see other 
moral aims as relevant, such as respecting all persons’ humanity.
 Could the Nazi have two conflicting present-directed intentions, for example, to 26
“eliminate all Jews” and “treat all persons with humanity” but only act on the former? No, 
for recall that present-directed intentions are controlling. Unlike desires, present-directed 
intentions do not come in diﬀerent strengths, so there is nothing to break the tie in the 
face of such a conflict. An agent with two conflicting present-directed intentions 
experiences practical paralysis until she revises or gives up on one of them. It is, of course, 
possible that the Nazi acts on the present-directed intention to “eliminate all Jews” while 
also having a future-directed intention to treat all persons with humanity. Such a 
combination of attitudes is psychologically possible, albeit arguably irrational. But future-
directed intentions are irrelevant to excuses. So the future-present conflicted Nazi does 
not have an excuse. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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intention as, on the whole, morally adequate, particularly in the context of 
a stressful overnight shift, which suggests that the doctor was being 
neither negligent nor reckless in her deliberation. To say that the doctor’s 
present-directed intention is, on the whole, morally adequate is not to say 
that it is wholly morally adequate. After all, it contains a moral mistake. 
But it contrasts with the cynical doctor who pursues the more intensive 
treatment to maximize the patient’s hospital bill. The cynical doctor’s 
actions reflect a lack of a morally adequate intention – maximizing the 
patient’s hospital bill is not a way of doing what’s best for the patient. Nor 
is it morally adequate when evaluated with respect to other plausible moral 
goals: doing the right thing or respecting all persons’ humanity.    27
 I suggested that we evaluate an agent’s intention for moral adequacy 
by assessing how adequate it is as a plan with respect to a relevant moral 
goal. This leaves a crucial question unaddressed, you might say: namely, 
what the criterion for moral adequacy is. What is the relevant moral goal? 
And how adequate is adequate enough to ground an excuse?    28
 The Good Intention Account does not aim to settle these questions. 
Diﬀerent normative theories will disagree about what the relevant moral 
goal is – whether it is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in the 
world or respect the humanity of all persons. They may disagree about 
whether there is a unique moral goal. It’s not for the Good Intention 
Account to settle those disputes. The Good Intention Account predicts 
that occasionally diﬀerent normative theories can come to diﬀerent 
verdicts on whether some consideration constitutes an excuse. 
 Equally, there can be moral disagreements about whether an agent’s 
intention is suﬃciently adequate to furnish them with an excuse. Again, 
these will have to be settled through first-order normative inquiry; I doubt 
that we can write down a simple formula.  
 The Good Intention Account diagnoses why disagreements about 
whether some wrongdoer has an excuse can persist, even when both parties 
agree on all features of the case, including the wrongdoer’s motivations. 
Such disagreements reflect conflicting moral judgments about the moral 
adequacy of an agent’s present-directed intention. I complain that your 
family member is constantly meddling, you say they are merely trying to 
help. I may well agree that their present-directed intention is to help but 
 The thought that moral adequacy admits of degrees chimes with the observation that 27
excuses can come in diﬀerent strengths: given a particular wrong, some excuses are better 
than others. One factor that can determine the strength of an excuse is how morally 
adequate it shows the agent’s present-directed intention to be. This may also explain why, 
other things being equal, moral ignorance generally strikes us as a weaker excuse than 
nonmoral ignorance. A present-directed intention that includes a moral misconception 
will necessarily fall short of full moral adequacy. These suggestions require much more 
careful spelling out –  something that I will have to leave for another paper. See my 
[forthcoming]. Still, the fact that the Good Intention Account has resources to make 
sense of excuses coming in diﬀerent strengths is reassuring.
 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.28
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think that that’s not a morally adequate intention to have. The morally 
adequate intention, in my view, would be to stay out of it –  a present-
directed intention the family member decidedly lacks. 
 The Good Intention Account thus says that a morally ignorant 
agent can sometimes have an excuse without saying that all instances of 
wrongdoing done from moral ignorance are excused. 
Moral Dilemmas  
 The Good Intention Account explains why an agent’s being caught 
in a moral dilemma constitutes an excuse. Such an agent is forced to 
choose between two morally impermissible choices: she will violate a 
moral norm or obligation whatever she decides on. On the Good 
Intention Account, it’s not surprising that we regard such an agent as 
having an excuse. If the situation is one in which she will act wrongly no 
matter what she does, her wrongdoing reflects her tragic options, not the 
lack of a morally adequate intention.  29
Emotional Upset 
 Another important class of excuses includes duress, provocation, 
and other emotional upset. The agent who gives in to police interrogation 
and falsely testifies against an innocent person acts wrongly under duress. 
The agent who snaps at a colleague because she is dealing with diﬃculties 
at home acts wrongly because she is stressed. Duress, coercion, stress do 
not generally render the agent’s actions unintentional. Nor do they need to 
compromise the agent’s epistemic capacities: the agent may give in to the 
interrogation, knowing that she shouldn’t or snap at her colleague, 
knowing it is an unkind thing to do. Yet they can excuse. 
 I suggest that when a stressful situation, emotional upset, or 
tiredness excuse, it is because they cause the agent to lose self-control. 
Self-control is the ability to put one’s present-directed intentions into 
action in the face of contrary desires. With her self-control lost, an agent 
cannot hold these contrary desires in check. Hence, she directs a sharp 
comment at her colleague, or gives in to the police’s demand.   30
 Loss of self-control excuses because it prevents the agent’s 
intention from guiding her action. The agent who loses self-control does 
not lose or revise her intention. It’s a mark of loss of self-control that one’s 
intentions remain intact – what goes missing is one’s ability to act on 
them. Instead, with her self-control undermined, the agent under stress or 
duress is guided by her momentary desires and inclinations: the desire to 
shut up the colleague, or to just make the interrogation stop.  
 Let me say a bit more about what is involved in losing self-control 
 Of course, provided she didn’t wind up in the dilemma through negligence or 29
recklessness. 
 See Holton [2009], chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of strength of will.30
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and how it diﬀers from weakness of will.  To illustrate, consider the well-31
known discussion by Austin:  
 I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into 
segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High 
Table: I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, 
thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why 
necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of 
myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf 
them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not 
a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even 
with finesse.  32
 The phenomenology of losing control of oneself – the experience of 
snapping at a colleague, while overtired, or giving away a secret when put 
under intense pressure – is very diﬀerent from that of giving in to the 
temptation of a second piece of cake. This diﬀerence is reflected in how we 
talk about the two phenomena. We “give in” to temptation, we “are (or let 
ourselves be) seduced”, we “succumb” to weakness of will. In contrast, to 
lose self-control is “to lose it”, “to break down”, “to explode”, “to snap”. 
 The diﬀerence in phenomenology is underpinned by a diﬀerence in 
psychological mechanism. As Holton writes:    
...a person exhibits weakness of will when they revise an intention 
in circumstances in which they should not have revised it.  33
 Thus, Austin’s desire for ice cream leads him to reconsider and give 
up on his intention to only take one piece, forming the intention to help 
himself to two slices instead. This new intention guides his action. The 
weak-willed agent’s ability to form and be guided by her intentions 
remains intact. Some ways of giving in to temptation can require a great 
deal of planning and, in Austin’s word, “finesse” (waiting for an opportune 
moment to swipe the second slice from the platter). The revising of our 
intention is often preceded by deliberation: we reconsider our options, we 
make up justifications and excuses. (Shouldn’t Professor Jones abstain, 
given her high cholesterol? Hasn’t the Bursar stealthily helped himself to 
two pieces of cake the other day?) 
 In contrast, the agent who “snaps” does not revise her intention to 
stay calm and polite to her colleague. Rather, her intention has simply no 
traction on what she does – she is so upset that her ability to plan is 
bypassed altogether, with her momentary desires winning out. Such loss of 
ability aﬀects the agent in more than just a “localized” way: not only does 
the intention to stay polite have no grip, neither does the intention to stay 
out of trouble, to not be found out, etc. As Holton & Schute argue:    
[W]e would expect a loss of self-control to have a systematic eﬀect 
 In this I am following the view set out by Holton [2009].31
 Austin [1957],  p. 24.32
 Holton [2009], p. 73.33
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on those actions that it would ordinarily inhibit. So, for instance, a 
lack of concern on the part of the agent for her own long-term 
welfare (manifested, say, in a lack of concern about being caught) 
would be evidence that self-control was in fact lost; in contrast, 
evidence of such concern (donning gloves before picking up the 
hammer to ensure that no finger prints were left) would be 
evidence that it was not.   34
 The weak-willed agent revises her intention when she shouldn’t, 
retaining self-control. The agent who “loses it” retains her intention but 
loses her ability to act on it. 
 Self-control is not the same as the ability to act intentionally. Thus, 
to say that Sara poured coﬀee into her colleague’s lap because she lost self-
control is not to say she did so unintentionally. The coﬀee pour was not 
just an unlucky accident – it was motivated by her momentary desires and 
aﬀective states: her anger at his obnoxious comment and her desire to shut 
him up. Nevertheless, her pouring the coﬀee is compatible with her having 
a present-directed intention to keep her cool. The provocation and the 
resulting anger made it impossible for that intention to guide her action.  35
 You might worry about the claim that when losing self-control we 
are “swept away” by our momentary desires. Are agents who lose self-
control really unable to reign themselves in? Take an exhausted parent, 
who shouts at her toddler. She may well have “kept it together”, had she 
tried harder, for example, had she been out in public. This may suggest that 
it’s never impossible to retain composure – it just becomes harder.    36
 In response, we need to distinguish the loss of self-control from the 
process leading up to it. Before self-control is lost, it is generally eroded. 
The more your self-control is eroded, the more eﬀort you have to put in to 
not lose it and the wider the range of situations and circumstances in 
 Holton & Schute [2007], p. 61.34
 I am assuming here that what Bratman [1987] calls The Simple View – the claim that 35
“A φ-ed intentionally if and only if A acted on the intention to φ”  –  is false. This 
assumption has been subject to extensive discussion in the philosophy of action literature. 
See also Bratman [1987] chapter 8. See Holton [2009], p. 15-17 why The Simple View 
should be rejected.
 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.36
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which you are vulnerable to losing it.  For example, the greater the agent’s 37
fear, stress, or sleep deprivation, the more eﬀort she has to put in to resist 
the police’s aggressive questioning and the more likely she is to “crack” as 
additional pressure is applied. The more sleep-deprived the parent, the 
more diﬃcult it is for her to remain patient at her toddler’s meltdowns and 
the more external support she requires to “keep it together”. 
 The objection is right that in many cases in which the agent loses 
self-control, she may have kept her composure, had she put in more eﬀort. 
But how much eﬀort we are capable of depends on a variety of factors, 
including whether one is well-rested or out in public. To say that one could 
have tried harder in a counterfactual situation is not to say that one could 
have tried harder in the actual one. Given the parent’s actual circumstances 
– sleep-deprived, home alone – greater eﬀort may have been beyond her. 
 Even if one could have avoided losing self-control with greater 
eﬀort, once self-control is lost, one is at the mercy of one’s desires. It’s only 
at that point –  once we “lose it” –  that all eﬀort gives out and we are 
overcome by an “ungovernable passion”. Loss of self-control is all-or-
nothing and instantaneous –  from one moment to the next, the agent 
“snaps”, “breaks down”, “explodes”. But, as already noted, the lead up to this 
point can be a drawn out, gradual aﬀair – just as a balloon stretches further 
and further until, eventually, it explodes. 
 It’s important that gradual erosion of self-control often precedes its 
loss because it means that loss of self-control can be culpable. Like mittens 
and diamond earrings, tempers can be lost through negligence or 
recklessness. We can knowingly put ourselves in situations that will erode 
our self-control and knowingly fail to extricate ourselves from situations 
that will erode it further. 
 We can be complicit in the erosion of our self-control by picking 
fights, drinking too much alcohol, neglecting to change topics of 
conversation, skipping lunch, failing to step out of the room for a deep 
breath or two. But our self-control can also be eroded through no fault of 
our own: a teething baby who is up all night, a family disaster, an 
unmanageable workload.    
 Let us return to wrongdoing. One virtue of the Good Intention 
Account is that it vindicates that weakness of will is no excuse. While both 
loss of self-control and weakness of will can lead to wrongdoing, they do 
 These observations are congruent with experimental work in neuroscience and 37
psychology. There is currently an ongoing and lively empirical debate about the 
mechanism of self-control. Notable contenders include Inzlicht’s attention-based model 
(see Milyavskaya & Inzlicht [2018]) and Baumeister’s resource-based model (see 
Baumeister [2000]). Both bear out the folk-psychological thought that self-control can be 
eroded but have diﬀerent implications for how erosion works, including whether 
depletion eﬀects are domain-general (i.e. whether an agent who has exerted self-control 
on one task will show depleted self-control on an unrelated task, as defended by 
Baumeister) or task-specific (as favored by Inzlicht). See Friese et al. [2019] for an 
overview over recent empirical evidence, which argues that empirical results are 
inconclusive.  
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so in diﬀerent ways. The weak-willed agent acts wrongly because she lacks 
a morally adequate intention – her weakness of will consists in her having 
given up on it. And so, according to the Good Intention Account, she does 
not have an excuse.  
 In contrast, the agent who as a result of duress, coercion, tiredness, 
or other distress loses self-control acts wrongly because she momentarily 
loses her ability to translate her present-directed intentions into action. 
Wrongdoing that results from loss of self-control thus need not reflect the 
lack of morally adequate intention.  
 The Good Intention Account says that loss of self-control can 
excuse, not that it always does. The restrictions on loss of self-control as an 
excuse mirror those on ignorance. Neither excuses when it’s the upshot of 
negligence or recklessness. This might explain why we typically look more 
favorably on the excuse of duress or coercion than on provocation. An 
agent under duress typically has not had any say over her upsetting 
situation. In cases of provocation things are often less clear cut. Even if we 
trust that the agent genuinely lost self control in the course of the bar 
fight, we might question whether she is culpable for having found herself 
in the midst of it.  
 Let’s step back. I argued that the Good Intention Account captures 
the motley bunch of considerations we recognize as excuses into a unified 
account: it traces the structure of excuses to the structure of our agency. 
Excuses which appeal to one’s wrongdoing being unintentional, trace the 
wrongdoing to limitations that are epistemic or agential (clumsiness, loss 
of balance). Excuses that appeal to one’s wrongdoing being the result of 
duress, coercion, tiredness, stress, etc, trace the wrongdoing to limitations 
in our will. Both make the case that, given the circumstances at hand, the 
wrongdoing does not indicate the lack of a morally adequate present-
directed intention.  
 The next task is to see how the Good Intention Account responds 
to some objections. 
6. Making Excuses and the Good Intention Account 
 The first worry is that the Good Intention Account makes excuses 
too individualistic. It says that whether someone has an excuse is a matter 
of their moral psychology: the presence or absence of morally adequate 
intentions. But, you might object, when we consider whether a wrongdoer 
has an excuse, we draw on general expectations about agents' range of 
capacities. Our practice of excuses is tied to this range.  38
 I suggest that general expectations about agents’ range of capacities 
play a crucial epistemic role in our practice of excuses. The reason why we 
dismiss out of hand considerations that completely contravene these 
general expectations – that Jill punched Samantha because she missed 10 
minutes of sleep last night –  is not that such considerations could not 
 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.38
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possibly excuse but rather that they suggest a moral psychology that is so 
unusual as to be beyond belief. (Not even toddlers are that fussy about 10 
minutes of sleep.)   
 In support of this, note that our assessment of excuses becomes 
both more nuanced and idiosyncratic the more familiar we are with 
someone and their quirks. We might not take oﬀense at our partner’s snide 
remark in the car because we know that she gets particularly stressed out 
driving in heavy traﬃc. We recognize this as an excuses for her misstep 
even though we would not recognize it as an excuse in general. Equally, 
knowing someone very well, we might not accept a consideration as an 
excuse, although we would do so for a stranger. If I know that Bertha has 
nerves of steel and thrives on the adrenaline of 5 simultaneous deadlines, I 
will not regard overwork as a plausible excuse for some misdeed of hers, 
even if I would generally cut someone in her position some slack.  
 When we oﬀer a highly idiosyncratic excuse, we do not just face 
the challenge of making it believable but also of establishing that, e.g. the 
loss of self-control was non-culpable. Suppose I can make a credible case 
that I snapped at my colleague because of caﬀeine withdrawal to which I 
am extremely sensitive. But if I know that missing one cup of coﬀee makes 
me so vulnerable to “losing it” – as I must, if I oﬀer it as an excuse – why 
didn’t I take precautions? Why didn’t I hold oﬀ that conversation until I 
caﬀeinated myself? Why don’t I keep an emergency jar of instant coﬀee in 
my house?  
 A second observation is that our practice of making excuses often 
appeals to the relevant oﬀense being “out of character” for the wrongdoer. 
Can the Good Intention Account explain this? On the Good Intention 
Account, such an appeal does not function as an excuse but rather as an 
expression of confidence that there must be some excuse. Since we know 
this person always to be guided by morally adequate intentions, the only 
way we can make sense of her wrongdoing is that something else must 
have gone awry. She must not have realized what she was doing, or must 
have lost self-control.   39
 Third, you may worry that the Moral Intention Account is 
vulnerable to counterexamples. In particular, you may think that duress and 
coercion can excuse even when there is no loss of self-control. Suppose 
someone threatens to harm my child unless I steal your wallet. I coolly 
calculate the risks involved and decide to commit the theft. Doesn’t the 
presence of the threat constitute an excuse even when my self-control was 
entirely unaﬀected? After all, I can bring up the threat in my apology and 
 The Good Intention Account also captures that appeals to character can block excuses. 39
You say I need to cut Mike some slack for being mean – he was stressed about a deadline. 
I point out he’s always a jerk, not just when he’s stressed. Thus, there is good independent 
reason for thinking that the agent generally lacks the relevant morally adequate intention 
and thus no reason to think it was present (but short-circuited) in this case.
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expect it to mitigate my guilt.   40
 According to the Good Intention Account, the mere presence of a 
threat does not constitute an excuse – what matters is its eﬀect on your 
motivation. To furnish you with an excuse, it must have either aﬀected 
your ability to reason or undermined your self-control (or both). If it did 
neither, it does not constitute an excuse. Still, the threat could make a 
diﬀerence to whether you are to blame because it’s plausible that, given the 
stakes, the theft was justified: the threat rendered stealing your wallet 
permissible.   41
 Excuses and justifications both bear on whether (and how much) 
an agent is to blame but they do so in diﬀerent ways. Justifications bear 
directly on the moral status of the action: on whether it was in fact wrong 
or impermissible. Excuses, in contrast, bear on the agent’s motivation. To 
make an excuse is not to deny that one’s action was wrong. Rather, it’s to 
point to one’s presence of morally adequate intention in order to mitigate 
how much one is to blame. 
 The Good Intention Account is an account of excuses, not of 
justifications. But some have suggested that the notion of excuse is 
derivative of the notion of justification. If so, it’s a mistake to think we can 
talk about one without talking about the other. Gardner has defended such 
a view; he argues that justifications are reasons why a given action is 
permissible; excuses are justified but false beliefs about those reasons:  
[Excuses] are what the person acting upon them takes to be valid 
reasons, and justifiably so. Thus the structure of excuse derives from 
the structure of justification. To excuse an action is not, of course, 
to justify that action. Rather, one justifies one’s belief that the 
action is justified.  42
 But there are reasons to doubt that the connection between excuses 
and justifications is so tight. 
 First, some considerations excuse in virtue of interfering with the 
agent’s reasoning, putting a justified belief beyond her reach. Suppose you 
put me under enormous stress as I am making a decision with important 
moral implications. I mess up my deliberation and, as a result, do the 
wrong thing. In appealing to this severe stress, I need not claim that I 
came to a justified belief that the course of action I took was permissible. I 
can simply point out that, given your interference, I was not in a position 
to come to a justified belief about what to do.  
 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.40
 The Good Intention Account also accommodates excuses for failures to perform 41
supererogatory actions. In general, we can infer from someone’s failure to perform a 
morally good (but not morally required) action that she lacked the present-directed 
intention to do what’s good. An excuse for failing to do the morally good (but not 
morally required) thing shows that this inference is unwarranted. For example, I didn’t 
give the homeless man change because I didn’t have my wallet on me. 
 Gardner [2007], p. 110, my highlight.42
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 Second, Gardner’s view does not sit well with many excuses that 
involve loss of self-control. Losing self-control can be understandable, 
relatable or regrettable but it is not something that can be reasonable or 
justified. Still, Gardner suggests that loss of self-control can be “reasonable” 
insofar as it is lost as a result of beliefs or emotions that are “reasonable”. 
We make an excuse for losing our temper by justifying the emotion or 
belief that led to it. 
By ‘reasonable’ here is meant, in my view, much the same as 
‘justified’. There must have been an undefeated reason for one's 
belief, emotion, etc. which also explains why one held the belief or 
experienced the emotion, etc.   43
 This may be plausible for anger or fear but not for tiredness, nausea, 
hunger, which we also recognize as excuses. Insofar as we think that the 
parent’s sleep-deprivation constitutes an excuse for her yelling, it’s not 
because we take her sleep-deprivation to be justified; tiredness, like nausea 
and headaches, does not admit of rational evaluation. Nor do we have to 
attribute to her a justified belief that it was permissible to yell. When these 
considerations excuse – that is, when the agent is not culpable for finding 
themselves in the relevant state –  it’s because they lead the agent to lose 
self-control. 
 The structure of excuses does not mirror the structure of 
justifications. Rather, it mirrors the fault lines of our agency. Excuses show 
that an instance of wrongdoing does not reflect a particular failing of our 
moral motivation: a lack of morally adequate intention. In doing so, the 
excuse need not portray the action as justified or reasonable by the agent’s 
own lights. As Holton & Schute argue for loss of self-control:  
…while the loss of self-control is not reasonable, it is something 
that can happen to the reasonable person.1  
Their point generalizes: mis-evaluating one’s evidence or losing one’s 
balance is not reasonable but these things, too, can happen to a reasonable 
person. Reasonable humans are still human; they remain susceptible to 
making mistakes when tired, stressed, anxious, to fall for misleading 
evidence, to lose their temper when angry and their nerve when afraid. 
 The Good Intention Account gives us an understanding of what 
excuses are –  in virtue of what considerations excuse. The question I turn 
to now is what excuses do. 
6. Excuses as Responsibility-Modifiers 
 The received wisdom says that an excused action is one for which the 
agent is neither to blame nor responsible. Thus, take Wallace: 
Excuses [...] aim precisely to challenge the claim (or suspicion) that 
S was morally responsible for x.  44
 ibid, p. 112.43
 Wallace [1994], p.121 The same line is also expressed by Murphy [1982], p. 508, Allais 44
[2008], p. 34-35. Rosen [2008], p. 609, Baron [2007], p. 27, Hieronymi [2001], p. 530.
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Excuses, on this view, are powerful indeed; they demarcate the boundaries 
of moral responsibility.  
 I disagree; I argue that excuses do not negate but modify an agent’s 
moral responsibility. They bear on the way in which an agent is responsible 
for what she has done.  
 Before I present the positive picture, I have to dislodge the received 
view. My argument that excuses leave moral responsibility intact goes as 
follows: excuses leave moral residue; they leave something for the agent to 
apologize, to make amends for, to feel distress about. The best explanation 
for why excuses leave such moral residue is that the agent is morally 
responsible for the wrong done. 
 Moral residue comes in two kinds: psychological and normative. 
Psychological residue refers to the attitudes and feelings rendered apt by 
wrongdoing: these can include feelings of guilt, remorse, anguish, sorrow, 
and grief on the part of the wrongdoer and resentment, indignation, 
disappointment on the part of victims and onlookers. Normative residue 
refers to the duties that one acquires as a result of having acted wrongly: to 
acknowledge what one has done, to apologize, to make amends, to explain 
oneself, to compensate. These duties –  reparative duties, as we may call 
them – are duties the wrongdoer owes to the wronged party, who holds a 
correlate set of reparative rights against the wrongdoer. 
 Lack of moral responsibility entails lack of moral residue. To see this, 
consider an example: your house mate accuses you of breaking a tea mug 
she held particularly dear and attempting to hide this from her (she found 
the shards in the trash). Your conscience is clear: someone else was the 
culprit. In light of this, you are not morally responsible. Consequently, it 
would be inappropriate for you to feel guilt, remorse, or sorrow. You may 
regret the sorry state of aﬀairs: the mug’s tragic demise, your housemate’s 
upset. But you do not have to regret anything that you have done.  You may 
owe it to your friend to cheer her up – but that’s a duty of friendship, not a 
reparative duty. You do not owe your friend an apology, a new mug, nor 
some other “making it up”-gesture. There is neither psychological nor 
normative residue. 
 Things are diﬀerent when it was you who broke it – even when you 
have an excuse. You were careful but the mug slipped out of your soapy 
hand while doing the dishes. You didn’t know that your friend was 
particularly attached to it (it was ordinary and in communal use in the 
kitchen), so you simply cleaned up the mess. Still there is both 
psychological and normative residue in this case: it is appropriate for you 
to feel bad for having broken the mug, you owe your friend an admission 
of guilt, an apology, an explanation for why you didn’t tell her, perhaps 
even a replacement mug. If you refused to apologize, simply shrugging and 
insisting that this was an accident and you are faultless, your friend would 
rightly be upset. By failing to apologize, you would violate a reparative 
duty and thus give her grounds for further complaint, over and above the 
original one. 
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 If excuses negated morally responsibility, we would expect the two 
cases to be morally equivalent. But they are not: there is moral residue in 
one but not the other. What explains this asymmetry? A natural 
explanation is that in one case you are morally responsible for breaking the 
mug – although you have an excuse. In the other you are not.  
 Let me fill in the resulting picture of moral responsibility a bit more 
before addressing objections.  
 Following Strawson, a common approach to moral responsibility 
views it as closely connected to a narrow set of reactive emotions: anger, 
indignation, and resentment. Thus Wallace argues:  
When we hold a person responsible for an unworthy act, we are 
subject to a negative reactive emotion because we believe the 
person to have violated a moral obligation we accept, or we believe 
that such an emotion would be rendered appropriate by the 
violation.  45
On this view, the paradigm way of holding someone responsible for a 
wrong is to resent them for it (or to regard such resentment as apt in light 
of the wrong).  
 My suggestion is to broaden our view of moral responsibility to 
include not just emotional responses and their expressions but also 
normative residue. Resentment is just one kind of psychological residue 
left by wrongdoing –  others can include disappointment, sadness, 
disillusion, frustration, pity. And wrongdoing leaves normative residue, too: 
owing an apology, an explanation, compensation.   46
 This suggests that moral responsibility can manifest in many 
diﬀerent ways.  Such a view is independently attractive; it fits naturally 47
with how we think of moral responsibility for right actions. Strawson 
highlights gratitude as a reactive attitude that responds to right actions.  48
Being grateful for someone’s kind action is certainly a way of giving them 
credit for it. But gratitude does not have a monopoly here: there is 
approval, admiration, respect, awe. There is owing someone some kind of 
acknowledgement or a favor in return. I can hold you morally responsible 
for your good deed by regarding any one of them as warranted.   
 Wallace [1994], p. 71. Wallace then goes on to narrow down the relevant class of 45
negative reactive emotions to resentment on p. 76.
 Note that while these attitudes are typically rendered apt by wrongdoing, some of them 46
can be apt even when there was no wrongdoing because the agent’s action was justified. It 
may be inappropriate to feel resentment and outrage towards such an agent, still other 
responses remain apt: she may owe an explanation and apology, it may be apt for her to 
feel bad. This fits well with the observation that justifications do not negate moral 
responsibility – when we justifiably violate a moral obligation, our action leaves a moral 
remainder.   




 On such a view, excuses function as responsibility-modifiers. They 
change the psychological and normative residue that remains in the wake 
of a wrong; they modify which attitudes are appropriate and which 
reparative actions are required. Excuses bear on the specific way in which 
an agent is morally responsible for what she has done; they bear on how 
wrongdoer, wronged party, and the moral community may and/or should 
respond to it. The normative eﬀect of any excuse will depend on the details 
of the case: the wrong in question, its circumstances, the nature of the 
relationship between the two parties. But excuses do not negate moral 
responsibility: some moral residue – psychological, normative, usually both 
– remains. 
 Importantly, excuses make a diﬀerence to an action’s psychological 
and normative residue without making a diﬀerence to its moral status –
  they do not negate its status as a wrong. This sets excuses apart from 
justifications, which bear on an action’s moral residue by showing that it 
was not a wrong all-things-considered.   
 This invites a first objection. Why accept that moral remainders 
indicate moral responsibility? You might point to Williams’ lorry driver to 
suggest that they may simply indicate bad moral luck. The driver ought to 
feel sorrow for his role in the accident that killed a child. But since the 
accident came about through no fault of his, he is not morally responsible 
for the death of the child. His connection to the death is merely causal. 
 But consider Williams’ own discussion of the case. He says:   
We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, 
indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his 
relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be 
eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault. It may be 
still more so in cases where agency is fuller than in such an 
accident, though still involuntary through ignorance.  49
 The objection only succeeds if causal responsibility is enough to 
ground this “special relation”. But I don’t think it is. Many individuals are 
causally responsible for the death of the child: the lorry driver’s employer 
who sent him on this particular route, the lorry manufacturer who 
produced the lorry. Yet while all of those various parties may regret the 
death of the child, it is only apt for the driver to feel sorrow and only he is 
an apt target for our pity. Why? Because while plenty of parties may have 
causally contributed to the death, it is only the lorry driver who killed the 
child. The significance of this is not causal but moral: it makes him, and 
not the others, morally responsible. 
 How could he be morally responsible, you might object, if he has not 
done anything wrong? Here we have to be careful. The lorry driver was 
neither reckless nor negligent: his brakes were checked, his speed below 
the speed limit, he was alert and watchful. Still, it is false that he has done 
nothing wrong: he killed a child. The killing was neither intentional, 
 Williams [1981]. p. 28.49
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reckless, nor negligent. But our moral obligation is not to kill, not merely 
to refrain from killing intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. 
 Of course there’s a diﬀerence between the lorry driver and a reckless 
road rowdy who kills a child in a deadly collision. The lorry driver has an 
excuse: the killing was unintentional (and neither negligent nor reckless). 
The reckless driver ought to feel remorse (indeed, be consumed by it), we 
are entitled to condemn and resent him. The unlucky driver, in contrast, 
ought to feel sorrow and grief and deserves our sympathy and pity. But it is 
only because he is morally responsible for killing the child that there is 
moral residue to contend with. The excuse does not negate the moral 
residue, it merely changes its nature. Thus, it would be wholly appropriate 
for the lorry driver to oﬀer the bereaved family not only his condolences 
but also his deepest apology and to ask for their forgiveness. And as 
Matthew Kramer argues:   
An apology accepts responsibility for a certain state of aﬀairs or 
chain of events, and admits that that state of aﬀairs or chain of 
events is wrong. It admits…that one’s treatment of somebody else 
has fallen short of minimally acceptable standards. Though the 
falling short may be heavily extenuated by one’s having adopted all 
reasonable precautions or by one’s having had to avert an even 
worse outcome, it remains a falling short. As such, it calls for a 
moral remedy or a set of moral remedies. An apology concedes as 
much, without denying the possible existence and weightiness of 
some mitigating considerations.   50
 Williams’ lorry driver is fictional but the analysis here chimes with 
the first-hand experience of those who have been involved in such fatal 
accidents. It is striking that these individuals self-attribute moral 
responsibility even when they are clear-eyed about the tragic circumstances 
and bad luck involved. A woman who, momentarily blinded by the evening 
sun, hit and killed a motorcyclist on her commute sums up: 
“Yes, it was an accident, and in a certain sense we were both to 
blame, but, at the end of the day, I hit him, I took his life,” she said. 
“No matter how much you want to dismiss it as an accident, I still 
feel responsible for it, and I am.”    51
I suggest that we should take such testimony at face value. In doing so, we 
heed Williams’ advice who cautions us that… 
…it would be a kind of insanity never to experience sentiments of 
this kind towards anyone [namely, the sorrow of the accidental 
killer and our pity for him], and it would be an insane concept of 
rationality which insisted that a rational person never would.  
 Kramer [2005], p. 330-31. Kramer defends the view that moral liability is “strict” and 50
that having taken impeccable precautions mitigate one’s remedial obligations, rather than 
absolving one from them altogether.
 Gregory [2017], online at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-51
sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer
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To take the testimony at face value is to accept that the woman feels 
morally responsible because she really is morally responsible, rather than 
because she is conceptually confused or irrational. This is not to deny the 
moral luck involved. On the contrary, it allows us to diagnose its nature: 
the bad luck consists in her having become morally responsible for killing 
another human, through no fault of her own. As Williams observes about 
Oedipus:  
“The terrible thing that happened to him, through no fault of his 
own, was that he did those things.” 
 One way of putting the claim that all excuses leave moral residue is 
to say that all excuses are partial. This may give you pause: surely, we don’t 
treat all instances of excused wrongdoing alike. The agent who assaults 
another party after repeated provocation in a bar elicits a very diﬀerent set 
of responses from the unlucky lorry driver.   
 But to say that all excuses are partial is not to say that all instances of 
excused wrongdoing are on a par. It is just to say that all excuses leave some 
moral residue. The nature and extent of this moral residue can vary widely, 
depending on the excused wrongdoing in question, its consequences (both 
moral and material), the circumstances in which it was committed, the 
relationship in whose context it took place, and the nature of the excuse 
itself: the wrongdoer may owe guilt, remorse, shame, sorrow, or regret, the 
wronged party may be entitled to feelings of anger, resentment, betrayal, 
sadness, or disappointment. Her reparative duties may range from the duty 
to make a quick apology to the duty to publicly admit guilt and pay 
compensation. I doubt there is a simple formula to determine moral 
residue –  it will have to be determined case by case, by substantive 
normative inquiry. 
 This sheds light on the intuitive distinction between the lorry driver 
and the provoked bar assailant. In the case of the lorry driver, the 
circumstances of the accident negate our entitlement to resentment and 
outrage and his obligation to feel remorse. In the case of the bar assailant, 
the fact that she was provoked only mitigates these entitlements and 
obligations. Philosophical discussion of blameworthiness often focusses on 
resentment and outrage: to be blameworthy is to be a legitimate target for 
those reactive attitudes.  This can make it natural to say that the the lorry 52
driver is not blameworthy, while the bar assailant remains somewhat 
blameworthy (although less than she would have been without the 
provocation). But we must not conflate blameworthiness, so understood, 
with moral responsibility. The lorry driver is not less responsible than the 
bar assailant; he is merely morally responsible in a diﬀerent way. Both 
agents’ excuses are partial; it’s only with respect to resentment that the bar 
assailant’s is more partial than the other.  53
 You may resist the thought that all excuses are partial. What about 
 See e.g. Wallace [1994], p. 7652
 I’m thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.53
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psychosis, sleep walking, hypnosis, or an epileptic seizure? Surely those are 
full excuses: they leave no moral residue and fully negate moral 
responsibility. 
 I agree that hypnosis, psychosis, or being asleep absolve the agent 
from moral responsibility. But it is a mistake to classify these 
considerations as excuses. Rather they are exemptions.  
 There are principled reasons for distinguishing exemptions from 
excuses.  Excuses, as we saw, acknowledge that you have committed a 54
wrong but mitigate your blame. But the fact that you have spilled the 
orange juice as a result of an epileptic seizures, hurt someone in the grip of 
a psychotic delusion, or stepped on someone’s foot while sleep walking do 
not show that you have acted wrongly but are not responsible for it. 
Rather, they undercut the charge that you have acted wrongly in the first 
place.   
 They do so because to act wrongly you must violate a moral 
obligation that applies to you. But epilepsy, sleep walking, or a psychotic 
episode show that moral obligations simply do not apply to the agent in 
question at the relevant time. We do not expect a psychotic agent to keep a 
secret, nor do we expect a sleep-walker to watch where they are stepping. 
For this reason, a psychotic agent may harm you in giving away your secret 
but this harm does not constitute a wrong. Similarly, an agent undergoing 
an epileptic seizure may harm you by crashing into you but she does not 
wrong you in doing so. Exemptions tell us that the agent permanently or 
temporarily lacked the basic faculties that constitute moral agency – a grip 
on reality, knowledge of right and wrong, the capacity for self-control. 
 The question of excuses arises only after we have already established 
that the agent has acted wrongly: that is, that she is not subject to an 
exemption. Moral obligations do bind the fatigued, the stressed, and the 
distracted. To say that their circumstances excuse is not to cease holding 
the agent up to the relevant norms and expectations; it’s just to recognize 
that her failure to comply with them is compatible with her having had a 
morally adequate present-directed intention.   55
 The distinction between exemption and excuse is drawn by Strawson [1962]: 54
“[exemptions] invite us to view the agent himself in a diﬀerent light from the light in 
which we should normally view one who has acted as he has acted.” While I agree that 
exemptions show the agent in a diﬀerent light, they also show the action itself in a 
diﬀerent light: they show it not to be an instance of wrongdoing. For more discussion on 
the distinction between excuses and exemption, see e.g. Gardner [2007], p. 132. Wallace 
[1994], chapter 6 also distinguishes between excuses and exemptions along the lines 
discussed here. 
 While excuses and exemptions are distinct normative phenomena, some considerations 55
can, depending on context, function as either, for example “being just a child”. This can 
indicate that a certain moral obligation just does not apply – we do not expect a three year 
old to keep a secret. But it can also function as an excuse: “she was acting on a good 
intention but didn't foresee the consequences of her action – she is just a child.”
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7. Conclusion 
What are excuses? What makes a given consideration an excuse? I have 
argued that excuses are considerations that acknowledge that the agent 
acted wrongly but deny that the wrongdoing resulted from a lack of 
morally adequate intention. This account of excuses, the Good Intention 
Account, captures the wide range of excuses that we recognize in our 
moral practice in a unified framework and distinguishes excuses from the 
related normative phenomena of justifications and exemptions. What do 
excuses do? I have argued that excuses are responsibility-modifiers. They 
do not negate moral responsibility but modify the way in which someone 
is morally responsible for what they have done. 
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